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di geometria proiettiva, Napoli, Pellerano), which improved the first edition of 1886. Amodeo gave up research on
geometry in 1899, after another negative evaluation of his work by a commission of well-known geometers—Eugenio
Beltrami, Eugenio Bertini, Luigi Bianchi, Enrico D’Ovidio, Salvatore Pincherle, Giuseppe Veronese.
This and other episodes are told by Amodeo himself in his Critical and historical synthesis of the geometry of
algebraic curves (Sintesi storico-critica della geometria delle curve algebriche) published in 1945. Here, Amodeo
also explains the development of Italian algebraic geometry, as well as his own contributions to the new geometry.
According to Franco and Nicla Palladino, Amodeo’s results on geometry have a scientific interest, but in my opinion
their argument is not well supported. Anyway, the letters contained in this book well describe the scientific back-
ground of the time. In Amodeo’s correspondence one can find a number of observations and notices about Italian
geometers—more than about Italian geometry. Several polemics—some well-known but others unknown to histori-
ans of mathematics—emerge here. Italian geometers indeed approached geometry from different points of view and
their letters testify to how difficult the passage towards the new methods of algebraic geometry was. Some polemics
involved Amodeo, others did not.
But it is true that Amodeo exchanged letters with some of the most important mathematicians of his time—in the
book one can find letters by and to Sannia, Segre, Peano, Castelnuovo, D’Ovidio, Del Pezzo, Fano, Pieri, Pascal,
Vailati, Vivanti, Castellano, and Gerbaldi. As was to be expected, not all the letters are equally interesting, and just a
few are impressive; as an example, only a small group of historians and mathematicians are likely to find interesting
the section concerning Amodeo’s life and work, as well as the 154 pages of letters between Sannia and Amodeo.
The letters are complemented by a 50-page long introduction that provides scientific context and a short biography
of Amodeo; an index of names; some appendices; and other letters that clarify some crucial points. The letters are
edited with notes that unfortunately not always offer enough mathematical background and technical tools to make
the letters intelligible.
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Oskar Becker und die Philosophie der Mathematik
Edited by Volker Peckhaus. München (Wilhelm Fink Verlag). 2005. ISBN 3-7705-4126-X. p. 352. Euro 44,90
Oskar Becker (1889–1964) came to philosophy from mathematics: he got a doctorate degree in Leipzig with a
thesis on axiomatic geometry (1914) under Otto Hölder’s direction and then obtained his Habilitation in Freiburg im
Breisgau with Husserl in 1922. He became Husserl’s assistant in 1923 and in 1924 published his major work, Mathe-
matische Existenz, strongly influenced by Martin Heidegger. He left Freiburg in 1931 to take up a chair in philosophy
at the University of Bonn. The most knowledgeable in mathematics among the Heideggerians, he was proud of having
been in contact with the core group of the Hilbert-Kreis, including W. Ackermann, J. v. Neumann, H. Weyl, and E. Zer-
melo. Although he had been very close to Nazi ideology, he was reinstated in his professorship in 1951. The reader of
this volume gets an overview of Becker’s intellectual biography in all matters related to philosophy of mathematics.
One may wonder, however, about possible connections between Becker’s (Heideggerian) anthropological approach in
philosophy of mathematics and his political stance. This subject is nowhere mentioned. Göttingen’s University library
preserves the draft of David Hilbert’s 1930 letter to Becker discussing Becker’s Mathematische Existenz six years
after its publication. Peckhaus’ anthology appeared three years ago. The delay in this review is due to unintended
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contingencies but is in no way the consequence of an a priori bias. On the contrary, Husserl read the second half of
Mathematische Existenz ten long years after its publication because Becker was shifting his intellectual allegiance
from him to Heidegger.
The book under review brings together a selection of 14 new contributions (two in English and the remaining
in German) classified under the rubrics History of Mathematics, Phenomenology of Time, Mathematical Ontology,
Intuitionism, Phenomenological Foundations of Mathematics and Sciences, Set Theory, Proof Theory. Under the
same rubrics, one also finds annotated editions of letters between Oskar Becker and Arendt Heyting, Hermann Weyl,
Dietrich Mahnke, Ernst Zermelo. The letters are printed in the German original while the critical apparatus comes in
English. Since the papers were originally presented as lectures on Becker held at the “Fernuniversität Hagen,” most of
them focus on Becker’s philosophy and history of mathematics. The two exceptions are Eberhard Knobloch’s paper on
proof and analogy in Archimedes, Kepler and Guldin, and Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer’s article about proto-theoretical
foundations of classical set theory. To put it briefly: this book provides a synopsis of one major development within
the philosophy of mathematics in the first half of the XXth century. The papers it contains are particularly relevant to
understand the ongoing phenomenological (Husserlian) discussion about this subject. On account of the high quality
of both the historical and theoretical insights it provides, the material related to the edition and/or the analysis of
Becker’s correspondence is of great interest for the reader of Historia Mathematica.
Mark van Atten introduces his publication of Becker’s correspondence with Arendt Heyting (pp. 119–142) with an
article about “Phenomenology’s Reception of Brouwer’s Choice Sequences” (pp. 101–117). As usual, van Atten draws
on carefully selected archival materials to arrive at the following results: Firstly, Brouwer’s “lawlike” and “lawless”
choice sequences are at the two extreme ends of a spectrum of sequences that leave many possibilities open in between.
Secondly, Weyl, during his intuitionistic period, seems not to see that one needs more notions of choice sequences than
just the lawless and the lawlike. Thirdly, in his Habilitationsschrift Becker speaks of the Brouwer–Weyl Theory and
seems to think that their conceptions are the same. Fourthly, Becker later adopted the character of Brouwer’s choice
sequences in his Mathematische Existenz, where he abandoned Husserl’s standpoint in favor of Heidegger’s. Fifthly,
although the philosophical view of (the later) Husserl and Brouwer have much in common, Husserl’s phenomenology
is not wedded to intuitionism. In all we have here five letters from Becker to Heyting and one from Heyting to Becker.
It originated in Heyting’s correction of one of Becker’s remarks in his Zur Logik der Modalitäten (1930). After some
questions concerning Heyting’s formalization of intuitionistic logic, Becker’s letter of September 19, 1933 argues
from a Heideggerian standpoint that intuitionism—in opposition to empty constructivism—is the properly human
mathematics. For this reason, he concludes, intuitionism seems to be especially adequate for the national revolution
in Germany (!). He even thinks that Aristotle was intuitionist in de interpretatione. Heyting objects that purely formal
equivalences do not guard against an anachronistic interpretation of calculus. In another letter Becker dealt with
Heyting’s booklet Mathematische Grundlagenforschung, Intuitionismus, Beweistheorie (1934) on the second number
class, and also with Kolmogoroff’s interpretation of intuitionistic logic as Aufgabenrechnung, and with Gentzen’s
study of a decision procedure for the propositional calculus.
As a follow-up to their publication in 2002 of two of Becker’s letters to Weyl now kept in Weyl’s Nachlaß at
ETH Zurich, Paolo Mancosu and T.A. Ryckman publish here four new letters from the same Nachlaß. They are
primarily concerned with issues in physics and geometry arising from Weyl’s response to Becker’s Habilitationsschrift
(1923) on the necessary phenomenological grounding of Euclidean geometry, and from Becker’s response to Weyl’s
speculative considerations on matter. The editors’ excellent introduction (pp. 152–210) gives archival information,
describes the transformation of phenomenology during the period 1923/24, provides a synopsis of the content of
the letters, discusses the mathematical and phenomenological context of Weyl’s work, and finally analyzes Becker’s
argument. Becker agrees with Weyl on the principle of transcendental idealism that captures the “transcendental
constitution of all ontological essences in pure consciousness” and underlines both Weyl’s continuum theory and
his purely infinitesimal geometry. In particular, Becker agrees with Weyl’s designation of a coordinate system as
the “residuum of Ego annihilation.” The editors succeed in identifying within this somewhat enigmatic expression a
rational technical core.
In his solo article entitled “Das Abenteuer der Vernunft: O. Becker and D. Mahnke on the Phenomenological
Foundations of the Exact Sciences” (pp. 229–243), Mancosu introduces Becker’s rich correspondence with the math-
ematically trained philosopher and Leibniz expert, Dietrich Mahnke, during the years 1926–1933. Peter Aust and
Jochen Sattler edit the twelve letters (using a numeration system different from Mancosu’s, pp. 245–278). Their main
concern is the relationship between the formal aspects of mathematics and intuition and, connected to it, the ques-
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tion of which phenomenological approach (Husserl’s or Heidegger’s or Becker’s) can best do justice to mathematical
knowledge. According to Becker, Hilbert’s transfinite elements are not accessible to Husserl’s formal ontology. For
this reason, Leibniz cannot be an ally of both, Husserl and Hilbert. Becker perceives a solution in Weyl’s “Wissenschaft
als symbolische Konstruktion des Menschen”: his “mantic phenomenology” defines nature through symbols.
Finally, Volker Peckhaus’s contribution “Becker and Zermelo” (pp. 279–297) publishes Becker’s letter to Zermelo
of December 12, 1930, when both were living in Freiburg. Zermelo returned there in 1921 from Zürich and one may
wonder if there was not a natural cooperation between the two during the twenties. Indeed, stressing that Zermelo
published nothing between 1914 and 1927, Peckhaus argues that partly because of ill-health and partly because of his
personality Zermelo felt isolated until he was appointed Honorarprofessor in Freiburg in 1926. Thus, when Becker
in his Mathematische Existenz called formal mathematics “formal games” (in opposition to the contextual truth of
metamathematics), he may have had Zermelo’s historical point of view in mind. Zermelo did study the application
of set theory to chess in 1913, but this does not seem to provide a strong foundation for this claim. In the letter here
considered, Becker formulates two questions he had discussed with Zermelo in a personal meeting they had had the
day before. The first concerns the cardinality of the continuum in Zermelo’s system, the second the inexhaustibility
(Unerschöpflichkeit) of the number progression. The letter shows that Becker was well informed about technical
points in set theory and able to criticize new developments (unfortunately, the references to Zermelo’s articles are
incomplete).
There are five additional contributions studying other aspects of Becker’s philosophical and historical work relat-
ing to mathematics. Christian Thiel (pp. 35–45) discusses Becker’s interpretation of Georg Zeuthen’s thesis: in Greek
mathematics geometrical constructions and their accompanying proofs served as existence proofs of the quantities
to be constructed. His carefully argued result is that Becker has taken up (whether consciously or unconsciously, he
cannot say) a much more stronger intuitionistic form of Zeuthen’s thesis. Antonello Giugliano provides a short philo-
sophical discussion (pp. 47–58) of the problem of “Number and Time: Becker between Nietzsche and Heidegger.”
Hans Poser’s contribution on ontology of mathematics (pp. 59–77) focuses on Becker’s thesis that if the being of all
kinds of objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit) is linked to the existence of the person, and if “Dasein” is in itself not a fact
but an ontological a priori structure, then intuitionism is an adequate foundational approach.
Becker saw the virtues of intuitionism in its ability to give a phenomenological access to transfinite notions. It is
in this light that he criticizes Hilbert’s formalism. Is Becker’s criticism of Hilbert’s concept of existence justified?
If one assumes with Becker that intuitionism is connected with an anthropological approach and formalism with
an absolute attitude, then Peckhaus’s second article (pp. 79–99) rightly characterizes Becker’s view on Hilbert as a
misinterpretation. This is all the more valid because Becker characterizes the opposition between intuitionism and
formalism through an analogy between idealism and realism. Indeed, Hilbert’s formalism, argues Peckhaus, is neutral
with respect to ontological and epistemic questions. Johannes Emrich’s contribution invites reflection on the concept
of “open horizon,” seemingly introduced by Becker in discussing the existence of mathematical objects. It is in fact a
Husserlian term that later on will play a central role in the “open philosophy” of Ferdinand Gonseth. Did he borrow the
expression from Becker? Be it as it may, Becker does not succeed in giving a working determination of the concept.
So, in the rest of his article the author tries to help Becker make sense of it.
This book is important because it offers a wealth of insights into Becker’s philosophy of mathematics as well as
into the many kinds of phenomenological approaches that were alive in Becker’s times. It is open to question, however,
whether Becker’s Heideggerian standpoint might have contributed substantially to the then ongoing discussions within
the philosophy of mathematics.
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